For decades after World War II, Greece and the United States moved largely in step—anchored in a shared framework of political values and strategic interests. Crises and disagreements were not absent, but Athens and Washington consistently maintained relations at the highest level, with open and functional channels of communication.
These extended from direct contact between the Greek prime minister’s office and the White House to steady engagement between the two countries’ foreign ministries. Crucially, it was the institutional diplomacy of the U.S. State Department—regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans were in power—that set priorities in a region long viewed by Washington as geopolitically critical.
Today, that picture is changing.
“Interests matter”
“For Trump, interests are what count—and Greek and U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean align,” a senior government official told TO BHMA.
Yet the current state of Greek–American relations differs markedly from the pre-Trump era. The way the White House now conducts foreign policy—often sidelining international law and multilateral institutions—has caused unease in Athens.
Moves such as the reported “abduction” of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, the creation of a so-called “Peace Council,” and even threats as far-reaching as the annexation of Greenland have repeatedly left the Greek government navigating awkward terrain.
A communication gap emerges
Roughly a year and a half after Donald Trump’s re-election, a noticeable gap in leader-level communication has emerged. Athens is also struggling to adapt to the growing reliance on the U.S. president’s “special envoys” as key instruments of foreign policy in the wider region.
A recent example was the visit to Athens—first reported by TO BHMA—of Richard Grenell and Paolo Zampolli, two White House associates who met with a range of Greek ministers and officials.
Particular concern has been sparked by the role of Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria. His public remarks suggesting possible arrangements for resolving Greek–Turkish disputes have raised eyebrows in Athens.
At the same time, the next round of the Greece–U.S. Strategic Dialogue remains in limbo. No preparatory contacts have been recorded, and while U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio maintains communication with Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, he has yet to signal any concrete intention to visit Greece.
Meanwhile, the State Department’s attention appears absorbed by the multiple global fronts opened by Trump. As one veteran diplomat put it bluntly, “Greece barely registers in Washington’s priorities right now.”
He pointed to contrasting U.S. diplomatic figures: Tom Barrack, deeply engaged in Turkey, Syria and the Middle East, and Kimberly Guilfoyle, who is described as focusing primarily on expanding U.S. business interests. Still, the U.S. ambassador maintains regular contact with Greece’s political leadership, speaking almost daily with senior ministers.
Navigating new realities
At the Maximos Mansion and the Greek Foreign Ministry, there is a clear understanding that Athens must adapt to this new environment while preserving the core of the bilateral relationship.
A senior diplomatic source described Greece as “generally satisfied” with ties to the United States. Yet there is also visible ambivalence—illustrated by Athens’ stance on the newly formed “Peace Council.”
Initially planning full participation in its inaugural session, Greece shifted position after Cyprus, other Mediterranean states and the European Union confirmed their involvement. Athens ultimately chose to attend as an observer, represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Haris Theocharis. Turkey, by contrast, was represented in Washington by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.
As government officials candidly acknowledge, “in the midst of all this fluidity, you cannot say ‘no’ to Trump twice in a row.”
Gaza, security—and strategic signaling
This logic also underpins Greece’s decision to participate in the U.S.-backed Civil-Military Coordination Center for Gaza, established under the October 2025 ceasefire agreement and operated by CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), the American military structure responsible for the Middle East.
While Greek officials stress that the goal is “to remain actively present in the region,” the move—combined with discussions about potentially deploying Greek armed forces personnel to Gaza—signals an ambition to position Greece as a regional power willing to operate on the ground.
Such positioning is likely to attract attention—and approval—from Washington.
Energy diplomacy and cautious optimism
Energy remains a cornerstone of Greece’s strategy in maintaining strong ties with the United States.
Despite the remaining steps needed to develop the Vertical Corridor project—aimed at boosting flows of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe—ongoing discussions continue, including a key meeting in Washington this week involving Greece’s energy minister.
The presence of major U.S. energy companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron in Greece further reinforces the bilateral relationship. It also draws the interest of the U.S. president and ensures regular contact between Greek officials, including Stavros Papastavrou, and their American counterparts.
“If Chevron didn’t have the White House’s approval, it wouldn’t be here,” a member of the prime minister’s diplomatic team noted.
Keeping a careful distance
Despite speculation about a possible Trump visit to Greece during celebrations marking 250 years since American independence, officials in Athens are cautious.
At the Maximos Mansion, there is a growing sense that a meeting between Mitsotakis and Trump at this stage might not serve Greece’s interests.
Seasoned government insiders suggest that Athens is watching closely the U.S. midterm elections in November. A potential political setback for Trump, they argue, could lead to a more moderate approach in foreign policy.
Until then, the prevailing doctrine appears to be one of strategic restraint:
Keep your distance—and keep the relationship intact.