The Time The NBA Took Away Four Jazz Draft Picks

Tanking, and all the discussion around it, has been an ugly subplot of the 2025-26 NBA season. At least, that is true for most teams. In the case of the Utah Jazz, though, it has been near enough the only plot.

Despite making an opportunity purchase when they acquired established star Jaren Jackson Jr from the Memphis Grizzlies at the trade deadline earlier this month, the Jazz have been at the foot of the Western Conference standings all season, as expected. They came in with a talent disparity, and have not much tried to remedy it. In fact, they have been shutting players down due to injuries, with some including Jusuf Nurkic opting for season-ending nasal surgery.

The NBA, however, does not necessary feel that the Jazz are making their best efforts to compete. As a part of a league-wide optics operation against what is seen to be the scourge of tanking – which in this instance means the practice of teams not doing all they can to win every given night, something most obviously manifest by benching players who could otherwise be healthy enough to play, so as to lose more games and improve their draft capital – the league has taken the disconcerting step of sending independent physicians to assess medical results. Put simply, they do not believe them.

Notwithstanding how widespread the practice is and has always been, the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement prohibits such “tanking” actions, and the league has apparently decided it is time to apply some enforcement therefore. And if the NBA feels they can prove the Jazz have not made good faith efforts, and levy any sanctions, it will not be the first time that the NBA has penalized the Jazz franchise in an attempt to stymie certain unsavory practices.

 

Jazz Looked To Make Moves Early

Back in 1976, the Jazz – at the time, the New Orleans Jazz – were a nascent franchise, and looking to make a splash. Only two years into their existence, they had already made one splash in acquiring Pete Maravich, one of the best to ever play the game, and were looking for someone to pair him with.

With this in mind, the Jazz made a big-time move when they signed Gail Goodrich – already a five-time All-Star and one-time NBA champion – as a free agent from the Los Angeles Lakers. Or at least, they tried to. Free agency, however, was not as “free” at the time as the name would have suggested.

In 1976, the NBA’s free agency system was still highly restrictive and looked very different from today. At that time, the league operated under a version of the “reserve clause,” a mechanism that allowed teams to retain control over a player’s rights even after his contract had expired. In practical terms, then, when a player finished his contract, he was not truly free to sign wherever he wanted. His team could effectively hold onto his rights, indefinitely, and movement to another franchise was heavily constrained.

 

The NBA’s Free Agency Debacle

This archaic system began to change as a result of a major antitrust lawsuit led by Oscar Robertson, who was serving as president of the players’ union. Filed in 1970, the lawsuit challenged the legality of the reserve clause and other restrictions that limited player mobility. The case was not resolved until 1976, when it was settled in conjunction with the ABA-NBA merger, marking the first real step toward free agency in professional basketball.

However, as the Jazz found out with Goodrich, the 1976 settlement still did not create true unrestricted free agency. Instead, it established what was often called “compensation free agency.” Under this system, a player who had completed his contract could sign with another team, but his former team was entitled to compensation in return. If the two franchises could not agree on what that compensation would be, then the NBA commissioner had the authority to determine i, be it in the form of players, draft picks or cash.

Functionally, then, signings could be turned into trades at the discretion of the boss, via what was essentially a forfeiture. And the Jazz paid a high price.

 

A Lost Decade Of Competitive Jazz

Because the cost of signing another team’s free agent was uncertain and potentially steep, many teams were hesitant to pursue such signings, which limited the practical impact of the new rules. The Jazz did it anyway with Goodrich, but then-Commissioner of the NBA, Larry O’Brien, determined that compensation should be paid. And it was substantial. O’Brien decreed that the Jazz should surrender each of their 1977, 1978 and 1979 first-round round draft picks, along with their 1980 second-round pick, getting back only a 1977 second and 1978 first in return from the Lakers in the process.

In the end, the 1977 Jazz first-round pick came in at #6, whereupon it was used on Kenny Carr. In 1978, it came in at #8, and was used on Freeman Williams. And in 1979, the Jazz won a lottery they did not want to win, and thus the grateful Lakers picked first overall – selecting Magic Johnson.

This league-altering selection came at the expense of the Jazz, whose great crime was trying not to violate federal anti-trust laws. In doing something within the rules designed to better their team, they wrought the ire of the NBA, and lost out on a decade of competitiveness. Notwithstanding the mountains of evidence, it is technically still a matter of subjective opinion whether teams in the present day can, should, and perhaps even do, engage in “tanking” strategies, and whether ethically it is acceptable or not given that sports should be about competitiveness and respecting the paying customers. Yet if the NBA’s own opinion skews towards “no”, they have a five decade precedent of punishing the Jazz behind them.

Mark Deeks I am continuously intrigued by the esoterica and minutiae of all the aspects of building a basketball team. I want to understand how to build the best basketball teams possible. No, I don’t know why, either. More about Mark Deeks