The Iranian government has proposed a 63 percent increase in tax revenues in its draft budget for the next fiscal year, a move that underscores the Islamic Republic’s effort to redirect greater financial resources toward military, security, and religious institutions.
Budget documents for the fiscal year beginning March 21, 2026, show that direct allocations to military and security forces will account for 16 percent of the government’s total general budget—about $10 billion—marking a 6 percent increase compared with the current year.
One-quarter of that amount will go to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose budget has risen by 24 percent year on year. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ access to state resources, however, extends well beyond its formal share of the general government budget.
Direct allocations to military and security forces will account for 16 percent of the government’s total general budget.
Under the current year’s budget, the government was required to hand over one-third of Iran’s exported oil to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This effectively made the Guard responsible for exporting approximately 600,000 barrels of oil per day and allowed it to retain the proceeds. Another third of oil export revenues went to the government, while the remainder was allocated to the National Development Fund, the National Iranian Oil Company, underdeveloped regions, and other needs.
In the budget for the coming year, however, the government has cut its own projected oil export revenues by 63 percent, allocating just 1,850 trillion rials—equivalent to about $2.17 billion at the official budget exchange rate.
Data from the commodity intelligence firm Kpler show that in recent months, Iran has been unloading around 1.2 million barrels per day at Chinese ports, much less than 2024 levels of roughly 1.5 million barrels.
At current prices, the value of just one month of Iranian oil unloaded at Chinese ports exceeds the government’s entire projected oil export revenue in next year’s budget. In simpler terms, although the draft budget does not explicitly state how much oil the government will provide to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, it will transfer the bulk of exports directly to the Guard. The government—together with the National Iranian Oil Company (14.5 percent), underdeveloped regions (2 percent), and the National Development Fund (20 percent)—will ultimately capture only about half of total oil revenues.
As a result, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ share of oil export revenues will rise from 30 percent this year to 50 percent next year. If exports continue at current levels, this will translate into more than $13 billion in revenue for the Revolutionary Guard.
In total, the real income that Iran’s military and security forces receive from the state amounts to around $23 billion. This figure does not include the vast economic and commercial empire that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps controls, both inside and outside Iran, which generates substantial revenues beyond the framework of the official state budget.
President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government has increased projected tax revenues by 63 percent in next year’s budget—meaning that the government will finance nearly half of its spending through taxes and duties—while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other institutions under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s authority remain exempt from taxation.
Put simply, the government has placed the burden of the budget squarely on the shoulders of citizens already struggling with widespread poverty and unemployment.
The government has placed the burden of the budget squarely on the shoulders of citizens already struggling with widespread poverty.
The draft budget also allocates 920 trillion rials—approximately $1.1 billion at the official budget exchange rate—to religious and ideological institutions. These include the Qom Seminary, Al-Mustafa International University, which plans to train 21,000 foreign religious students next year, the Islamic Development Organization, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, among others. Taken together, the budgets of these institutions amount to roughly half of the total oil export revenues projected in the government’s general budget.
The government’s failure to address deepening economic and livelihood crises has coincided with a nearly 70 percent depreciation of the rial against the U.S. dollar in 2025. The dollar now trades at around 1.4 million rials on the open market.
In recent days, bazaar merchants and ordinary citizens have staged protests against the continuing collapse of the currency and the spread of poverty and economic stagnation. In recent months, food prices have doubled, while the government has raised public-sector wages by only 20 percent in next year’s budget. Iran’s current minimum monthly wage stands at around $100. Security forces have responded with repression, and on December 29, 2025, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branded the protests “sedition.”
While the Guard seeks to restore order with threats and repression, the Iranian budget suggests the regime is not prepared to undertake any serious reform; quite the contrary, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps now takes the attitude, “Let them eat cake.”