Adding to this analysis, I have noticed that as Turkey increases its pressure and threats, it frequently prompts other countries to push back, form alliances against it, and limit Turkey’s options.
This pattern is not unique to Turkey. Looking at the Eastern Mediterranean and comparing it to Russia’s war in Ukraine, we see a similar pattern: when powerful countries try to change borders by force, they usually provoke resistance instead of gaining control.
The Foreign Affairs article explains that Erdoğan frequently uses history to justify Turkey’s actions. He describes Turkey as a natural leader in the region whose power was unfairly limited before. Russia has used the same kind of thinking in its actions toward Ukraine. According to a report from the Jamestown Foundation, Vladimir Putin downplays Ukraine’s independence by referencing Soviet-era borders, effectively questioning the legitimacy of Ukraine as a separate country and using historical arguments to challenge current international boundaries. But history does not sanction aggression, nor does it deprive a country of its right to govern itself.
Cyprus is an example of how this way of thinking does not work in real life. Turkey maintains a permanent military presence in northern Cyprus and challenges the Republic of Cyprus’s maritime rights, assuming that sustained pressure will force a smaller state to concede. This strategy has not succeeded. Instead, Turkey’s actions have drawn more international attention to Cyprus, strengthened Cyprus’s legal case, and pushed other countries to support it. On January 1, 2026, Cyprus will assume the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time since joining the Union in 2004.
Greece’s answer was almost the same. Faced with Turkish threats and military activity in the Aegean, Greece strengthened its alliances, modernized its military, and became a key regional security partner. Turkish pressure has, in fact, enhanced Greece’s strategic value to its allies.
This result is very similar to what happened in Eastern Europe. Russia invaded Ukraine, expecting to win quickly and to see the West divided. Instead, Ukraine fought back, NATO grew stronger, and many countries gave more support to Kyiv. Finland and Sweden joined the Atlantic Alliance. In both situations, trying to dominate neighbors led to those neighbors working more closely together.
Since 2021, the EU has sharply reduced its reliance on Russian pipeline gas, lowering Russia’s share of total imports from roughly 45 % to under 20 % by 2024. LNG’s share of gas imports jumped from about 20 % to nearly 37 %—with LNG imports rising to over 20 % in early 2025—illustrating how Europe diversified away from coercive energy dependence.
The wars in Cyprus and Ukraine teach us an important lesson: no country has the right to invade or attack another country just because of history or old claims. History does not excuse violence. International law, national sovereignty, and alliances remain essential.
International relations theory (Stephen Walt, 1987) holds that when a country strives to expand its power illegitimately, it often faces resistance and new alliances rather than achieving its imperial goals. As these issues persist, we need to consider how to prevent future revisionism without causing further conflict. Policies should support international law, strengthen collective security, and prioritize long-term stability over short-term gains.
Western policy should not reward aggression. Concessions made under the threat of war or coercion show weakness. They normalize violations of international law, undermine deterrence, and invite further aggression. The world needs peace, not wars.