In the hierarchy of global crises, the long-running conflict between Greece and Turkey ranks relatively low. For Greece and the Greek public, however, the picture is different: The confrontation with their eastern neighbor has traditionally dominated foreign and security policy. For Turkey’s leadership, by contrast, the Greece file ranks lower on the agenda amid today’s political turbulence.
Developments to Turkey’s south and east are of greater importance to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Ankara holds a key role when it comes to shaping Syria’s future. Whether Iran, Gaza, or – not least – the war in Ukraine, Turkey has been adept at vying for power and influence across multiple flashpoints of international politics.
Donald Trump, it should be added, is not known to have shown particular interest in Greek-Turkish issues. Whether he has a firm grasp of the complex maritime legal questions in the Eastern Mediterranean appears doubtful.
The announced Greek-Turkish summit in Ankara is unlikely to change that. The meeting at the highest political level has been postponed twice, which at best suggests a lack of urgency. One might almost conclude that Athens and Ankara have come to terms with the status quo. Yet the situation is more complicated. Political scientists sometimes describe this as a “frozen” conflict: relative calm prevails on the surface, while core disputes remain unresolved, leaving the conflict liable to “thaw” at any time.
Summits provide an opportunity to take stock. That occurs behind closed doors among the political leaders, as well as in the numerous analyses that fill newspaper pages in the days surrounding the occasion. Lengthy interviews with the political leaders are also part of the Greek-Turkish diplomatic routine, offering detailed explorations of the conflict’s many facets.
“Since we signed the Athens Declaration more than two years ago, we have achieved some important gains that we should not neglect,” Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said in an extensive television interview, pointing to a “very clear reduction in tensions” in the airspace over the Aegean. According to Mitsotakis, Turkish violations of Greek airspace have virtually ceased. He also praised the “very good” cooperation with Turkey on migration. Still, he harbors no illusions. On the issue that is central from the Greek perspective – the delimitation of exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf – no convergence is visible despite diplomatic efforts; positions remain frozen, hence the sober assessment in Athens.
Considerable irritation in Greece was triggered ahead of the summit by Turkish Navtex notices indicating that half of the Aegean Sea falls under Turkish authority. “Any research activities within maritime jurisdiction areas and the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea must be coordinated with our country,” a spokesperson for Turkey’s Defense Ministry declared, adding that the restrictive notice was not time-limited.
Ankara’s renewed reference in this context to what it views as the unlawful militarization of eastern Aegean islands can be seen as an additional strain on the bilateral climate. The Greek government’s response was correspondingly blunt. “Greece cannot take such an approach seriously, and Turkey knows this well,” said Defense Minister Nikos Dendias, known for his sometimes hard-edged rhetoric toward Ankara. “We will not allow Ankara to act as if it can impose itself in practice. We have never seen anything like this before.”
Navtex notices have no binding force under international law. Nevertheless, the arbitrary and unilateral definition of maritime zones and jurisdictions creates a normative – and thus political – reality, as it publicly documents Turkish ambitions for a de facto division of the Aegean.
On the diplomatic stage, remarks by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also drew attention. He spoke of “a historic opportunity for a lasting solution to the Aegean problem,” without explaining the source of his optimism. As far as is known, Athens and Ankara remain miles apart on a mutually acceptable settlement. Disagreement persists not only over the substance of the various sub-disputes – essentially questions of territorial delimitation in and above the Aegean Sea. The long history of the conflict also shows that Athens and Ankara have not always been aligned on the method by which a solution should be reached.
Ahead of his meeting with Erdogan, the Greek prime minister once again floated the idea of referring the dispute over maritime rights to international arbitration, but made this conditional on the withdrawal of challenges to Greek sovereignty. It is hardly to be expected that Ankara will warm to this option, particularly as Turkey does not recognize the current law of the sea with its comparatively strong emphasis on the rights of islands.
Despite the many differences, Athens and Ankara appear to be aligned on one important point. Both seem to prefer that no third party – under present circumstances, only the United States would qualify – sit at the negotiating table. In cautious diplomatic language, Mitsotakis noted that “we do not need (external) mediators to discuss the issues that concern our two countries.”
Whether Greeks and Turks possess the political will and imagination to resolve the complex disputes dividing them without outside help remains an open question. Under current circumstances, it is already an achievement that both sides are keen to ensure that the line of communication does not break.
Dr. Ronald Meinardus is a senior research fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.