A Ukrainian serviceman fires toward Russian positions in Kherson in this file photo. [Reuters]
There are some things that simply cannot be disputed after nearly fours years of war: Russia’s invasion was not provoked by something Ukraine did, and there was no way Ukraine would be made a member of NATO, especially after losing Crimea in 2014 and the ensuing war in Donbas in 2015-2017. The Kremlin’s excuses about the de-Nazification of Ukraine and protecting the Russian minority are spurious to say the least. The causes of the war can be found in Russia’s expansionist ideology and in the perceptions that shape the Putin regime. Numerous statements made by Russian officials tell us as much.
Regardless, Greece sided with Ukraine from the very beginning of the war, for obvious reasons. Seeking to alter national borders through the use of force is a violation of international law and a challenge to the prevailing European order. Given Turkish revisionism in the Aegean and Cyprus, Athens could not have been indifferent toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The shelling of Mariupol and many ethnic Greek villages in the Sea of Azov region caused a further deterioration in Greek-Russian relations.
The question, however, is whether Athens should have sent military equipment to Ukraine. According to what has been made known, Greece has provided the Ukraine military with ammunition, anti-tank missiles, armored vehicles and portable surface-to-air missiles. Doing so was a bold decision that needs to be analyzed at three different levels. First, the Russian invasion sent shockwaves through most Western capitals. A total of 25 European states, including tiny Luxembourg, decided to help Ukraine defend itself, though Austria, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus – each for their own reasons – decided not to follow suit. Greece was therefore also free to choose not to send military assistance. It could, instead, have sent non-lethal material, as Israel did. This may have allowed Athens to maintain its channels of communication with Moscow.
Second, the Greek stance cannot be explained with reference to Athens’ relationship with Washington. Alignment with Ukraine certainly elevated Greece’s position in American planning, as evidenced by the logistics and military hub that was opened in Alexandroupoli and the recent agreement for the transportation of American liquified natural gas through Greece. At the same time, though, Greek-Russian relations reached a nadir unseen since 1991. Athens does not have the luxury to be in a head-on confrontation with a superpower that is also a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In this regard, statements of the “we are at war with Russia” kind, coming from high-ranking officials, seem shortsighted to say the least.
The decision to send military equipment to Ukraine was taken by the prime minister personally, and only afterward approved, hastily, by the Government Council on Foreign and Defense Affairs
Thirdly, the decision to send military equipment to Ukraine was taken by the prime minister personally, and only afterward approved, hastily, by the Government Council on Foreign and Defense Affairs (KYSEA). The decision was not put to consultation with the other party chiefs, nor was it discussed in Parliament in any substantial way. Greece has always tended to avoid direct involvement in wars and armed conflicts.
The prime minister’s actions on Ukraine were a break with that “tradition” and one that did not have cross-party consensus. In other words, a very important decision with a profound impact on Greek foreign policy was taken on the basis of personal rather than collective assessments and judgments. Since then, the frequent invocation of the Russian threat in connection with domestic issues (e.g., the mobilizations over the Tempe rail tragedy) has created even greater confusion in the public mind.
The Greek side has many good reasons to support Ukraine, but it also needs to think about the future and its relationship with Russia. Brussels and the big European powers are in the process of preparing for a tough confrontation with Moscow, with the possibility of normalization not even being on the table. So now is the time to ask ourselves whether such a development is ultimately in our national interest.
Manos Karagiannis is professor of international relations in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies at the University of Macedonia, and reader in international security at the Department of Defense Studies at King’s College London.