Competition between China and the United States over two ports in Panama is just one recent example of how strategically-located harbors are becoming flashpoints in great power competition.
A new report and dataset released today by AidData, a research lab at William & Mary, speak to this timely issue by capturing in unprecedented detail an important plank in China’s economic and foreign policy platform: control of overseas ports. More than 100 students at William & Mary had a hand in the construction of the dataset.
The “Anchoring Global Ambitions” report finds that, between 2000 and 2025, Chinese official entities and state-owned enterprises provided loans and grants worth nearly $24 billion for 168 ports across 90 countries — reaching nearly every corner of the world. The dataset, Chinese-Financed Ports Overseas and Related Terminals Dataset, version 2.0 (CPORTS 2.0), is available online for free.
With coverage through the end of 2025, the research presents a near-real-time picture of Beijing’s global port footprint, including new ports and those that are proposed but not yet funded, including Lobito Port in Angola, Sandino Port in Nicaragua, and Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port in Kuwait.
It also includes new data on Chinese-funded shoreside port equipment, like cranes and scanners. The study provides a set of policy recommendations for China’s rivals and competitors, as well as countries that host Chinese-financed ports.
China’s shifting maritime strategy
“AidData’s research has rarely found evidence to support the ‘debt trap’ narrative popular in many capital cities. If anything, this new report strengthens the argument that China does not seek sovereign control of overseas territory as much as it does strategic security,” said Alexander Wooley, the report’s lead author and AidData’s director of partnerships and communications.
The report examines the role of overseas ports as key gateways to China’s supply lines.
“Over the past two decades, Chinese agencies and companies have increasingly shifted towards financing seaports to retain access and export critical commodities,” said Lea Thome, a co-author of the report and a program manager at AidData. “These hubs of connectivity include the construction, expansion or financing of ports in proximity or connected to other strategic investments.”
The data shows that Chinese state-owned creditors increasingly co-locate port financing with other investments vital for China’s national security, such as critical mineral operations. For example, the report identifies 22 Chinese-financed mines within a 500-kilometer radius of Chinese-financed seaports and focuses on two key case studies: the Port of Chancay in Peru and the Port of Morébaya in Guinea.
China’s overseas financing for ports and equipment
In total, Chinese state-owned creditors and donors have bankrolled over 363 unique seaport projects and activities around the globe, with the most heavily-financed ports being:
- Hambantota International Port in Sri Lanka ($1.97 billion)
- The Port of Newcastle in Australia ($1.32 billion)
- The Autonomous Port of Kribi in Cameroon ($1.17 billion)
- The Port of Melbourne in Australia ($1.14 billion)
- Haifa Port in Israel ($1.13 billion)
“A fifth of all Chinese seaports projects were at ports with both a Chinese owner and operator, suggesting that Beijing’s priorities may extend beyond equity ownership toward securing operational control,” said Sheng Zhang, a co-author of the report and a senior research analyst at AidData. “China is investing in a global network of ports that can receive its vast exports and facilitate the import of essential minerals and commodities.”
For the first time, AidData researchers tracked Beijing’s overseas port financing in high-income countries, as well as the world’s developing economies.
“Chinese financing for global seaports is almost evenly split between high-income and low- and middle-income countries,” said Rory Fedorochko, a co-author and program manager at AidData. “Nearly half of the total lending — $10.8 billion — supports 29 port locations across 20 high-income countries — including Greece, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei — and for projects where the intent is generally commercial, rather than geopolitical.”
But the new report also suggests that the higher the level of Chinese involvement at a given port, the more likely it is to host some type of Chinese naval activity (including port calls, medical ship visits, and joint military exercises).
Chinese naval activity has taken place in more than 50% of Chinese-financed port facilities where there is also a Chinese owner. There is substantially less Chinese naval activity in Chinese-financed port facilities that are not owned or operated by Chinese entities.
Implications for maritime and economic statecraft
A team of research scientists, analysts, program managers and communications professionals from across AidData conducted the analysis. The authors urge policymakers wishing to compete with China to develop a long-term overseas port financing strategy that incentivizes holistic planning and integration with other critical aspects of the maritime domain, including operations, supply lines, shipping and shipbuilding.
The report also proposes concrete steps for host governments and beneficiaries to develop domestic policy assessment tools for incoming offers of port investments and port management, from China and other creditors.
Lastly, the AidData researchers propose the establishment of an inter-disciplinary research task force to further the data collection and analysis effort and bring together stakeholders from government, academia and industry.
The new report and dataset build upon a previous investigation by AidData researchers into Beijing’s port financing in low- and middle-income countries.
Read more in the full press release on the AidData website.