The Greek frigate Kimon approaches the port of Limassol, Cyprus, March 4. [AP]
One month after the launch of operations by Israel and the United States against Iran, the situation remains opaque and complex. Both the prospect of deeper US involvement – whether through a ground intervention or a dramatic move that would allow President Donald Trump to declare victory and withdraw – and that of at least a partial agreement between Washington and Tehran appear equally plausible. The American president seems to be searching for an exit strategy, but one that leaves him with tangible gains.
Although a settlement with some degree of permanence will likely be pursued, deep mutual mistrust, Iran’s leadership crisis, and the fundamentally divergent interests of the parties involved – differences that currently appear difficult to bridge – limit optimism for a definitive resolution, particularly regarding tensions between Iran and Israel. Regional actors – the Arab monarchies, Turkey, and even Pakistan – must also be factored in, as they will be significantly affected. This will be the case whether new leadership in Tehran emerges with broadly similar views on Iran’s regional role, or the regime is overthrown and replaced by a more cooperative authority. Perhaps even more concerning is the risk of Iran descending into prolonged instability or civil war, which could empower even more hardline figures lacking experience and pragmatism, with unpredictable and potentially aggressive agendas.
From a geopolitical standpoint, Greece can be counted among the beneficiaries. It responded immediately to the Republic of Cyprus’ call to strengthen its defenses, as the EU member-state closest to the conflict zone and one that had already been targeted by Hezbollah, whose longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah [who was killed in 2024] had declared it a legitimate target. In contrast to Britain’s notably delayed response, Greece’s swift actions encouraged other European countries to join the mission to protect Cyprus. More importantly, it brought renewed attention to the European equivalent of NATO’s Article 5 – Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty – and the possibility of activating it when necessary.
Athens and Nicosia, even if only temporarily, succeeded in redirecting European attention to their southeastern borders. Developments highlight the strategic error of focusing exclusively on threats and challenges to European security originating from the east. Turkey, meanwhile, exposed itself in the case of Cyprus with its erratic decision to send warplanes to protect Turkish Cypriots – raising the question: from whom? It also became evident that Greece holds a comparative advantage in air defense, as Bulgaria even sought its assistance. Under challenging conditions, Greece demonstrated its capacity to provide security rather than merely consume it, most notably through the effective deployment of Patriot systems to safeguard energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. In doing so, it has emerged as one of the few pillars of stability in an increasingly volatile regional environment, strengthening its voice in future developments.
However, at least one major challenge has arisen, and how it is addressed will determine whether Greece will benefit over the long term. Regional alliances and partnerships, as shaped in recent years, may need to be reassessed, adjusted, or even fundamentally reconfigured. Israel is the key variable, given its strong ties with both Greece and Cyprus. Some regional actors now view it as a destabilizing force, while others see it as a revisionist power seeking not only to impose its agenda but also to alter borders and enforce population displacements, also by expanding settlements. Equally concerning are targeted killings and military actions conducted outside the framework of international law. After all, the devastation of Gaza and the uncompromising stance of the Israeli leadership on the Palestinian issue have brought Turkey closer to Egypt and several Arab monarchies.
Greece’s relationship with Tel Aviv should remain stable. However, if future Israeli governments maintain the same approach, a recalibration of that relationship will be necessary. At the same time, Greece must continue to strengthen its ties with key Arab states, as well as with India, and remain actively engaged with whatever political reality ultimately emerges in Iran. Balanced relations – even if they lean toward Israel – create opportunities for mediation at multiple levels, which can later be capitalized on.
Constantinos Filis is an associate professor at the American College of Greece and director of its Institute of Global Affairs.