Athens — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan faces mounting strategic pressures on two fronts amid ongoing efforts to stabilize relations with Greece, even as core disputes in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean persist.
In the north, the Black Sea–Aegean Sea Corridor (also known as the Aegean-Black Sea Vertical Corridor) continues to gain momentum as a key multimodal transport axis linking Greek ports to Central and Eastern Europe. Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania held a working meeting in Sofia in late January/early February 2026, agreeing to submit a joint application for EU funding to modernize the Thessaloniki–Sofia–Bucharest rail line. Technical planning is targeted for completion by June 2026, with contractor selection by year-end. Direct passenger services between Thessaloniki and Sofia—halted since around 2017—are expected to resume by 2027. The corridor, incorporating ports such as Thessaloniki and Alexandroupoli, enhances trade connectivity and NATO military mobility on the alliance’s eastern flank while offering alternatives to routes through the Turkish Straits, thereby diminishing Ankara’s traditional leverage over regional transit.
On the southern energy front, Greece pressed ahead with hydrocarbon exploration despite Turkish objections. On February 16, 2026, a Chevron-led consortium (Chevron 70%, HELLENiQ ENERGY 30%) signed exclusive lease agreements for four offshore blocks: South Crete 1, South Crete 2, south of the Peloponnese, and Block A2. The initial phase focuses on seismic surveys to evaluate natural gas potential in these areas south of Greek territory.
Turkey’s Defense Ministry responded sharply on February 19, describing the activities as “unlawful” and a violation of international law and good neighborly relations. Spokesperson Rear Adm. Zeki Aktürk noted that while the blocks do not directly impact Turkey’s continental shelf, they contravene principles tied to broader maritime claims, including references to the 2019 Turkey-Libya memorandum. Greece rejected the criticism, affirming that the permits fall within its sovereign jurisdiction and align with international law.
These developments coincide with pragmatic diplomatic engagement. On February 11, 2026, Erdogan hosted Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Ankara for the 6th Türkiye-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council. The leaders held frank discussions on Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean positions, migration (with flows down significantly in recent periods), and confidence-building measures. Several agreements were signed to strengthen legal, cultural, and economic ties.
Both reaffirmed the bilateral trade target of elevating volumes from approximately $7 billion in 2025 to $10 billion. Erdogan emphasized full educational and religious rights for the Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace under the Treaty of Lausanne, while Mitsotakis stressed equal citizenship for the religious Muslim minority in Thrace and the importance of international law in resolving disputes. Mitsotakis described the talks as “sincere and substantial,” highlighting a commitment to stability and dialogue without concessions on core sovereignty issues.
Analysts view these parallel tracks—eroding Turkish transit influence via northern infrastructure, advancing Western-backed energy exploration in the south, and sustained high-level contact—as emblematic of Erdogan’s delicate balancing act. While strategic divergences remain unresolved, both sides appear focused on containing escalation risks between the NATO partners through practical cooperation and open channels.