BENGHAZI, LIBYA—Libyans applauded Greece’s decision to open a consulate in Benghazi. On March 28, 2025, Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis opened the mission. He also met with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army.
The Turks were so concerned by the development—even though Gerapetritis visited Tripoli a few days later—that the Turkish ambassador rushed to Benghazi to meet with Deputy Commander-in-Chief Saddam Haftar just two days later.
Reopening the Benghazi consulate and meeting with Khalifa Haftar was wise. While the United Nations, European Union, and United States recognize the government in Tripoli, such recognition is arbitrary and increasingly contrary to Greece’s interests. The Libyan National Army controls 70 percent of Libya, including its major oil and gas fields. While Americans know Benghazi primarily because of the tragic murder of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens in 2012. Steven had just met with Turkish Consul General Ali Sait Akın prior to the attack by Ansar al-Sharia and other extremist groups. That Akın drove past the advancing mob and did not warn Stevens is a scandal that remains unresolved.
Too few Americans and Europeans appreciate what came next: Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity to clear out the extremists. More than 5,000 Libyan National Army and civilians lost their lives fighting street-by-street throughout Benghazi and the region. As Gerapetritis saw, the scars of that fight remain readily visible from the old city to the cathedral. Today, however, Cranes and new construction dominate the city.
How sad it is, then, that the default Greek position seems to undermine Benghazi’s security and success to the advantage of Ankara.
While the Libyan National Army controls upwards of 70 percent of the country, Athens follows the lead of the European Union and the United Nations to recognize the Tripoli-based government Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh. The fact that the United Nations and European Union recognize Tripoli’s Government of National Unity is both arbitrary and undemocratic. When Libya held elections in 2012, Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood groups lost badly. They rejected the outcome, and the United Nations, fearful of violence, promoted dialogue to award through outside intervention what Libyan voters never wanted or sought. Regardless, the electoral mandate of Dbeibeh’s government has expired.
Rather than assess reality on the ground, the European Union digs in its heels and supports a government that controls little on the ground, provides no security for the extraction or transport of oil and gas, shelters increasingly violent militias.
By deferring to Brussels, Athens also props up the very same government that earlier signed the illegal maritime accord with Ankara. Athens’ protestations mean little when it has a choice between Libyans who abide by the law but instead embrace Turkey’s falsehoods.
Gerapetritis can defer to the European Union ahead of Greece’s presidency next year, but the European Union is unreliable on security. Many European Union officials come from countries that, unlike Greece, are sheltered from the security challenges that frontline European states face.
Unfortunately, under Gerapetritis, the same pattern applies elsewhere in Africa. The United Nations Security Council recognized Somaliland as an independent country in 1960, and after its failed union with Somalia, it has operated as an independent state since 1991. It is democratic and pro-Western, while the rest of Somalia is increasingly chaotic and Islamist. It is one thing for Greece to defer on recognition of Somaliland, but the level of hostility of Greek authorities—refusing to meet Somalilanders, dissuading Greeks from inviting them to dialogues, and treating Somaliland as a pariah state—is a dream for Turkey. After all, Somalia today is a Turkish satrapy whose geographic position could give Ankara the ability to interfere with Greece’s commercial shipping fleet.
Perhaps Gerapetritis fears that recognizing Somaliland would somehow legitimize Turkey’s colonial claims in Cyprus, but the two cases are not analogous. Somaliland was independent, and its union with Somalia never ratified. It is analogous to Czechia or Slovakia; Senegal or Gambia; and Egypt or Syria, all of which reverted to independence after failed federations with their neighbors. Turkey’s occupation of northern Cyprus is more analogous to the Russia’s promotion of the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics, carved from sovereign Ukrainian territory.
Athens is right to open its consulate in Benghazi. Frankly, it should follow suit in Hargeisa as well. But, it is wrong to prioritize diplomatic protocol and subordinate itself to a European Union policy that so undermines its interests in favor of Turkey’s. Policymakers in Athens often hand-wring at Turkey’s encroachments, but their complaints are meaningless when Gerapetritis can promote Greek interests but instead chooses to pursue policies in Africa that might as well have been crafted by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.