Having served on Donald Trump’s first National Security Council, Richard Goldberg was among a select group of experts whom the White House called upon, immediately after the second inauguration, to help establish the Energy Dominance Council.
Now back at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he heads the newly created Energy Program, Goldberg is among the few in Washington with a deep understanding of the White House’s vision for US energy dominance, the strategy behind it, and the geopolitical significance of the Eastern Mediterranean.
In an exclusive interview with Kathimerini, he discusses Greece’s role in the emerging energy landscape, the need for regional cooperation beyond past rivalries, the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) – which, as he stresses, must move forward without delay – and the major energy initiatives involving leading US companies.
You helped establish the Energy Dominance Council at the beginning of this administration. How does the Eastern Mediterranean fit into the broader vision of US energy dominance?
As a geographic region, it’s very important to our energy dominance agenda. It serves as a crossroads connecting the United States to Europe, the Middle East and potentially the Indo-Pacific. So, it’s a highly strategic area when we think about the export of US energy –particularly LNG, but not only that. The region also has its own oil and gas resources, both under development and with US energy companies already on the ground. There’s significant potential for infrastructure projects to be developed by US companies and investors, which would, in turn, create more opportunities to hook our European, Middle Eastern and Indo-Pacific allies and partners to a US-led energy supply chain. Ultimately, that’s the broader objective of American energy dominance.
Greece stands at the crossroads of what you’ve described as the emerging energy dominance corridor. How do you see Greece’s role?
Positioned there in Southeast Europe on the Mediterranean, Greece offers a unique ability to receive US energy exports coming through the Mediterranean and establish a north-south corridor that can move American LNG directly into Central and Eastern Europe in large quantities. This helps unhook Central and Eastern Europe – and Western Europe, for that matter – from Russian gas much more quickly. At the same time, we can build additional east-west corridors through Cyprus and Israel into the Middle East to complete the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor. Of course, it takes more than geography – it takes a willing and reliable partner. And in Greece, we have both: the exact right strategic location and a trusted ally that wants to be part of this strategy for the mutual benefit of the United States and Europe.
You speak of larger quantities of US LNG. Should we expect to see US involvement – through investment, DFC support, or other means – in that process?
It’s possible you could see that. It will all depend on the projects and the specific requirements as US companies look to upgrade the infrastructure. To the extent that financing is needed – whether from the Export-Import Bank or the Development Finance Corporation – all of those tools are available should private sector firms need them.
You mentioned the region’s energy resources and the US companies already on the ground. Are you confident that these projects can move forward as planned despite the existing regional tensions?
I think so, because it’s to everyone’s mutual benefit. I believe we’re moving beyond the era of zero-sum games, where something is perceived as disadvantaging Turkey, and therefore Turkey objects to it, or something is seen as disadvantaging Greece or Cyprus, and so they object to it in turn. When we look at the bigger picture, there’s enormous demand, a vast amount of infrastructure to be developed, and significant volumes of goods that will move through everyone’s territory and waters. Since all these countries are aligned with the United States as allies or partners, the old saying that a “rising tide lifts all boats” really applies here. That’s the direction the US government is taking, and it’s the message we’re sending to all parties: We don’t want to see any party interfere with this mutually beneficial expansion of energy infrastructure. In fact, thanks to US leadership, Turkey is already benefiting from the restart of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline. Erdogan should be saying thank you. At the same time, there’s no reason for Turkey to interfere with further development of energy infrastructure that connects India, the Middle East and Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean. Such interference would not benefit Turkey, the US, or our East Med partners. I believe we’re now at a point where we should approach this collaboratively, focusing on comparative advantages rather than zero-sum geopolitical games.
So, I guess you would agree with the proposal that the Greek prime minister recently announced regarding a five-party framework to discuss a range of issues, including the – as you mentioned – sometimes overlapping maritime zones?
I think it’s missing one important country, Israel. And we would want to make sure we don’t leave Israel out of that equation. Israel is already a core player in the region from a gas perspective, with the ability to continue expanding that capacity to serve the Middle East and North Africa. It also has the opportunity to establish pipeline connections to Saudi Arabia for gas exports down to the western coast of Saudi Arabia, which would actually be beneficial for Jeddah, while also serving as an access point for the potential export of oil from Saudi Arabia up through the Mediterranean. And so, as we see the energy infrastructure and the future of Israel being important to the region, having them not included in such a forum does not make sense to me. That’s why the 3+1 exists with Israel and we can expand these schemes. We saw [Indian] Prime Minister Modi visit Cyprus already and talk about upgrading infrastructure there for future IMEC plans. If we can see Saudi-Israeli normalization, I would see the Saudis playing a key role in this forum alongside the Emiratis. And if we want to add Turkey, if we want to add Libya, you know, that makes perfect sense to me as key players in this important area when it comes to energy. We could even add Iraq at some point, given the connectivity of northern Iraq to Turkey and into the Eastern Mediterranean. So I think all of these things are tied up in the normalization agenda that the Trump administration has pursued. I think it’s a reminder of how mutually beneficial and unstoppable the momentum is toward normalization and integration of the region. And so is it a good idea to have Libya and Turkey at the table? Yes, it is a good idea. It shouldn’t be at the expense of Israel or the broader regional integration.
On Libya, should we expect to see American companies getting involved in energy projects there? There’s been a noticeable uptick in activity recently, with meetings and official visits taking place all the time.
In general, I think that if we can see stability take hold and move toward unification in Libya, the country can become a reliable partner, not just through the lens of energy, but strategically for the US. I also think that, at some point, Libya could join the normalization momentum with Israel and be a key player in this future regional integration. The question is, can that occur? There are other interests at play trying to stop that momentum and maintain conflict between east and west, and I think the Russians are key in fomenting that instability. We need to push back on that. It is important for the US to be at the table, to keep the Libyans close, to push the Russians out of any new sphere of influence, and to help move Libya into a modern, integrated economic and energy infrastructure linked to the rest of the region. If we can accomplish that, I do think there is a role for Libya at the table. We should be talking to them, keeping them close, and not allowing them to fall into any Russian schemes.
When you describe this huge east-west corridor, the IMEC project, it’s not only about energy – it’s also about electricity, as Prime Minister Modi highlighted during his visit to Cyprus. But here we have the Great Sea Interconnector, which doesn’t seem to be moving forward, because of Turkey. How can the US help unblock this project?
I think the GSI should be a high US priority. We should make it very clear to the Turks that we are delivering on a number of fronts that benefit them, and that this is not a zero-sum game. The ability to connect the grid from Europe across the Middle East and to trade electricity back and forth would be a game changer as part of this regional economic integration. At times, I’ve worried that the Cypriots have been hesitant to put up the cash for the project on their side, and that we’ve sometimes shifted or deflected blame onto the Turks rather than just putting some skin in the game ourselves. So I would say let’s move it forward. Let’s have Greece, Cyprus and Israel, with US support, start the process. And if the Turks move forward, and we actually see them come out and try to stop something, we can address it then. But we should not allow the potential of Turkish interference to be an excuse for us not to start the project, because I think it’s a really important one.