When INEOS appointed Ruben Amorim as Manchester United’s head coach 14 months ago, the problem wasn’t immediately obvious. The Portuguese coach was formally introduced with that exact title. In nearly 150 years of club history, the only other “head coach” had been Wilf McGuinness, who stepped in back in 1969 as a replacement for the legendary Matt Busby. Everyone else to sit on United’s bench has carried the title of manager.
Presenting Amorim as head coach was meant to be a symbolic signal that Manchester United were finally done searching for a new Sir Alex Ferguson. There would be no more reliance on improvisation, charisma, or the myth of the all-powerful leader. Instead, the club was supposed to turn toward processes and a corporate hierarchy, the structure INEOS planned to install after the chaotic years under Ed Woodward. Amorim as head coach, rather than manager, was meant to indicate that they wanted someone to run processes, not rule over them.
And it was precisely there, in that detail which may seem trivial to me but is hugely important in England, that was supposed to mark a new beginning for the entire organisation. In reality, it marked the beginning of Amorim’s end at United.
Erik ten Hag was the coach Sir Jim Ratcliffe inherited when he entered United’s ownership and governance structure. Ratcliffe insisted on continuity, avoided rash decisions, and allowed Ten Hag to spend hundreds of million. But he was never the owner’s choice. The new owner tolerated him for a while, then eventually pulled the trigger and brought in Amorim, who was supposed to represent a clean break and the full start of the INEOS era.
INEOS had already held key partnerships in successful cycling, sailing, and motorsport teams, and its portfolio included stakes in football clubs. Even before arriving at United, the company had a sports division led by Jean-Claude Blanc, who had successful executive spells at Juventus and Paris Saint-Germain. United fans had endured years of frustration and would probably have accepted almost anyone replacing the Glazer family, but Ratcliffe seemed like a good idea. He was a lifelong supporter, motivated, surrounded by proven sports executives, wealthy, and INEOS enjoyed a very positive public image in England.
Amorim Was Rigid and Uncompromising
On paper, Amorim looked like the ideal choice. He was young, articulate, tactically consistent, and extremely successful at Sporting. He arrived at Manchester United with an attractive footballing idea and the discipline to stay loyal to it.
It may not matter much in practical terms, but it was symbolic that Amorim said goodbye to Sporting by completely dismantling Manchester City in the Champions League. Pep Guardiola tried to regain control, but Amorim’s 3-4-3 system, with wide centre-backs stepping into the half-spaces and narrowly positioned wingers, suffocated City’s midfield and turned turnovers into lethal counterattacks. Every player knew exactly what their task was at all times. Everything was in place. Sporting demonstrated what it looks like when a system matures organically and everyone believes in it.
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The problem was that Manchester United are not a club where ideas are given time to grow, not even under INEOS. Ratcliffe brought in Dan Ashworth, waited for him to arrive from Newcastle as if he were a saviour, and then Ashworth left after just five months in a separation that cost United over £4 million. Before that, John Murtough, the football director, was removed, Darren Fletcher was dismissed as technical director, and scouts and academy heads were replaced. United are simply not a club where time can be treated as a reliable resource when implementing an idea.
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The bigger issue was that Amorim never truly accepted this reality.
His tenure can be summed up like this: he was very convincing when explaining what he wanted, but far less convincing in proving that it actually worked. He insisted on the 3-4-3 system that had brought him dominance in Portugal, but in Elgnad, the players looked like they were operating in a language they had only just started learning. They knew the basic phrases, guessed at meanings, but did not understand the nuances.
Over time, Amorim’s greatest strength became his weakness. His loyalty to his idea, belief in his system, and strict reliance on structured solutions slowly evolved into stubbornness. He was rigid and unwilling to compromise. When he admitted that he did not want to change his approach so players would not think he was bowing to pressure, it sounded like an admission that he was not ready for a coaching role at a club like the Red Devils.
It would be unfair to say United had no ideas under Amorim. They tried to control second balls, attack space, and break quickly, much like Sporting did against City. But theywere a team without security. They attacked with the intention of being fast and aggressive, yet in key moments the players looked hesitant, as if they were not playing a sport they are exceptionally good at but instead thinking about which of the coach’s solutions they were supposed to follow.
A Clash with the Hierarchy
Unlike at Sporting, where the system matured organically, Amorim tried to force his system onto Manchester United. The players never fully embraced it, and United were often expected to show more initiative than simply relying on counterattacks.
Reducing Amorim’s failure to bad tactics would be completely wrong. Toward the end, he did adapt certain things. He adjusted the formation and increasingly opted for long balls from the goalkeeper after realising that United’s first phase of build-up simply was not good enough to beat Premier League pressing systems, which are far more sophisticated than those in Portugal.
The much bigger issue than the 3-4-3 system was his relationship with the club hierarchy. He was hired as head coach, but he insisted on transfers, wanted to be involved in decision-making, and wanted to act like a manager, as his predecessors had. When he did not get what he wanted, he felt undermined. From that perspective, his conflict with Jason Wilcox was not merely personal. It was a collision of two visions: INEOS’s, in which the coach must be flexible and fit within the club hierarchy, and Amorim’s, in which everything must be subordinated to the coach’s idea and demands.
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Amorim felt his territory within the club shrinking, so he tried to protect his position through public statements. Instead, he only made things worse. Openness about internal processes, which can be seen as a virtue in smaller environments, becomes a trigger for conflict at a club of this size. It is especially problematic when a coach keeps explaining what he wants and what should be done, while failing to win matches. Such appearances create doubt, not the understanding he was hoping for.
That brings us to the key question: was Amorim simply the wrong choice, or is the mistake embedded much deeper in the process?
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INEOS figures are convinced the problem lay in execution, not in the idea of flexibility itself. But it is hard to ignore the pattern. United talk about long-term projects and want the structure symbolised by appointing a head coach rather than a manager, yet it still feels like the club has not clearly defined where the coach’s responsibility ends and where the board’s responsibility begins. Amorim made mistakes and showed in many details that he was not ready for United, but it is impossible that none of the coaches United have changed over the past decade were good enough.
United’s issue is not the coaches. Sacking Amorim will not solve anything, just as sacking Ten Hag solved nothing. For more than ten years, United have been searching for an identity and a structure to replace Ferguson’s authority. INEOS have not delivered what was expected. In some respects, they have been worse than the Glazers and Woodward. Perhaps instead of looking for another head coach, United need a manager to whom they would hand the keys. That is a luxury Amorim, for all his flaws, was never truly given. And that, ultimately, remains the problem at the heart of Manchester United.
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